First off, I would like to share with you guys a link to a film about Wittgenstein directed by Derek Jarman. It was recommended to me by a professor in the GD department and I think it could be a helpful/fun watch. You can watch the entire thing here:
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2608378371506756422
I also have some quick commentaries regarding the issue of fraudulence in the Cavell reading, which I see some people have already brought up in previous posts.
To me, it seems that in his discussion of fraudulence Cavell falls into the same 'linguistic' trap that he (and Wittgenstein) identify as the source of otherwise insignificant philosophical problems. In other words, Cavell's rather obscure distinction between genuine and fraudulent 'art' resorts to the same kind of out-of-context use of essentialized and absolute language that he wishes philosophy would purge itself of.
-We impose a demand for absoluteness upon a concept, and then, finding that our ordinary use of this concept does not meet our demand, we accommodate the discrepancy as nearly as possible (77)
In reading through the entirety of his argument(s) I feel that his weakest claim is that the potential fraudulence of a work of art is essential to the aesthetic experience it represents. Although perhaps I am misunderstanding his argument, is seems like he is saying that distrust in the object of art is an essential part of aesthetic experience, which is not exactly the same as Kant's claim that aesthetic judgement is made with objective conviction because it is made at the risk of potential isolation.
If the question of whether or not atonal compositions are music is rendered irrelevant through the simple act of immersing oneself "within the experience of such compositions" (84) then so can the question of an art object's authenticity through a viewer's aesthetic experience of it.
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2608378371506756422
I also have some quick commentaries regarding the issue of fraudulence in the Cavell reading, which I see some people have already brought up in previous posts.
To me, it seems that in his discussion of fraudulence Cavell falls into the same 'linguistic' trap that he (and Wittgenstein) identify as the source of otherwise insignificant philosophical problems. In other words, Cavell's rather obscure distinction between genuine and fraudulent 'art' resorts to the same kind of out-of-context use of essentialized and absolute language that he wishes philosophy would purge itself of.
-We impose a demand for absoluteness upon a concept, and then, finding that our ordinary use of this concept does not meet our demand, we accommodate the discrepancy as nearly as possible (77)
In reading through the entirety of his argument(s) I feel that his weakest claim is that the potential fraudulence of a work of art is essential to the aesthetic experience it represents. Although perhaps I am misunderstanding his argument, is seems like he is saying that distrust in the object of art is an essential part of aesthetic experience, which is not exactly the same as Kant's claim that aesthetic judgement is made with objective conviction because it is made at the risk of potential isolation.
If the question of whether or not atonal compositions are music is rendered irrelevant through the simple act of immersing oneself "within the experience of such compositions" (84) then so can the question of an art object's authenticity through a viewer's aesthetic experience of it.
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oh yeah, forgot wittgenstein liked boys.. that movie's awesome/absurd..
ReplyDeletewhy is the claim that "distrust in the object of art is an essential part of aesthetic experience" weak?